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German Council on Foreign Relations
A Capable EU Is No 
Utopia: Strategic  
Lessons from the 
German Presidency
Overall, as the COVID-19 crisis unfold-
ed, the EU proved capable to act. Crisis 
management addressing the pandem-
ic benefited from the fact that Germany 
held the presidency of the EU Council in 
the second half of 2020 and could build 
upon its traditional approach: develop-
ing European capabilities, including all 
governments, and being prepared for 
the unexpected. Now, going forward, 
Germany needs to use its experience 
with complexity and uncertainty to help 
form a strategic doctrine for the EU.
 
Germany held the presidency of the 
EU Council from July 1 through De-
cember 31, 2020. Before its tenure 
began, expectations were high that 
Berlin would finally present a strate-
gic agenda ambitious and concrete 
enough to reflect its central role in 
the European Union – and be a match 
for the French. Since French Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 Sor-
bonne speech, in which he presented 
a long list of ideas for the EU, he has 
been promoting a grand vision of the 
EU’s development that encompass-
es everything from a European Mone-
tary Fund to a new notion of European 
defence. But, despite these expecta-
tions, Germany simply did not follow 
suit. Instead of making grand strategic 
proposals, Berlin focused its contribu-
tions to the conversation about the fu-
ture of the EU on inclusively building 
up the EU’s readiness and capacity to 
act, both internally and externally. 
When the “worst crisis since the Sec-
ond World War” hit in spring 2020, 
shaking up the global economy and 
Europe’s picture of both the United 
States and China, France was blind-
sided. But because Germany had qui-
etly chosen to make the EU’s capacity 
to act its theme – both in preparation 
for its presidency and following a de-
cade of unexpected European crises – 
it was able to refocus its agenda on-
to acute crisis management. What had 
initially seemed a rather abstract and 
open-ended reform agenda for the 
EU was then vividly tested by the pan-
demic in real time. The actions of Ger-
many’s presidency showcased in very 
practical and urgent terms what “Euro-
pean capacity to act” means: the ability 
to react to an unforeseen event, iden-
tify European weaknesses and needs, 
derive concrete policy goals, make de-
cisions, and mobilize both the political 
will and resources to deliver and imple-
ment the political agenda.
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As a result, the EU managed, more or 
less united, to get through the first 
two waves of the pandemic and lay the 
groundwork for the tremendous task of 
economic recovery by putting togeth-
er the “Next Generation EU” recovery 
fund. Admittedly, the EU – the Euro-
pean Commission and member states 
– f loundered at the start. Member 
states needed time to find an effective 
mode of coordinating their health sys-
tems. But by the late spring and sum-
mer months of 2020, the EU had come 
a long way: it was procuring medical 
products, building up reserves for crit-
ical medical equipment, safeguarding a 
minimum of free movement, and mas-
tering different facets of crisis-man-
agement – from early warning and 
prevention to organizing long-term re-
covery instruments. 
This is not to say that all facets of cri-
sis management are going smooth-
ly. As was to be expected, vaccine pro-
curement and rollout have proven to 
be particularly bumpy due not only to 
a high level of politicization, but also 
far-reaching differences between EU 
member states – including those re-
garding leverage toward pharmaceu-
tical companies and the financial re-
sources available for procurement or 
national vaccination strategies, to just 
name a few examples. Despite such dif-
ferences, EU member states eventual-
ly agreed on a concerted EU approach 
to negotiations with the pharmaceuti-
cal sector. As a result, the process took 
longer, costing precious time, but en-
sured early access to vaccines for both 
bigger, wealthier member states like 
Germany and smaller ones. Altogether, 
the previous months have thus clear-
ly demonstrated two things: first, how 
urgently the EU needs to be capable to 
act to address future scenarios no mat-
ter how they unfold and, second, how 
crucial the role of member states is in 
getting there.
FROM CAPACITY TO REACT 
TO CAPACITY TO SHAPE
Until now, lively intra-EU discourse 
has focused on defining terms such as 
economic, digital, and industrial sov-
ereignty or strategic autonomy. While 
policy-makers and policy analysts have 
little trouble stating what sovereign-
ty and autonomy do not mean – pro-
tectionism, the EU turning its back on 
the United States – they all too often 
cannot define what they do. In ma-
ny cases, their debate has proven divi-
sive. Each strategist suspects the oth-
ers of uploading their own national 
notion of “sovereignty” or “autonomy” 
to the European level. The back and 
forth between President Macron and 
German Defence Minister Annegret 
Kramp-Karrenbauer in November 
2020 about the meaning of “strategic 
autonomy” is only one example of ma-
ny that illustrates the danger of relying 
on fuzzy terms. 
By contrast, there is political con-
sensus across member states and in-
stitutions that the EU must be capa-
ble to act under various conditions 
and toward multiple actors. And, al-
though “capacity to act” may likewise 
seem like just another fuzzy term, it 
has at least been road-tested – with 
all member states still on board. In 
the coming months, nuanced evalua-
tion is needed in order to assess just 
how capable the EU would really be to 
act under different conditions. At first 
glance, the EU often seems to man-
age to turn its ship around in emer-
gency and crisis situations. Although 
its efforts are mostly last-minute, ad-
hoc, and made under suboptimal con-
ditions with unclear long-term impli-
cations, they are quick and effective 
enough to prevent the worst. This is a 
strength upon which to build.
Yet, a major deficit has become ap-
parent. Although capacity to act al-
so implies the ability to shape, the EU 
struggles to affect its environment 
proactively and preemptively – in oth-
er words, strategically. This deficiency, 
which threatens to leave it with a mere 
“capacity to react,” has much to do 
with a lack of cross-sectoral long-term 
planning on the member state level. 
The fact that member states feel un-
able to commit to the European Union 
has negative effects on the availability 
of resources and the predictability and 
credibility of the EU’s political action. 
Consequently, a central precondition 
for the EU to be a capable actor vis-
à-vis major powers such as the Unit-
ed States or China is that all EU players 
first believe that it is indeed possible. 
German-style commitment to building 
up capabilities and preparing institu-
tions sufficiently to face multiple, un-
certain future scenarios must, there-
fore, be married with French-style 
strategic vision and self-confidence.
A DIFFERENT KIND OF 
STRATEGY-MAKING
Commentators have yet to notice the 
emergence of this possible new doc-
trine for guiding the EU into the fu-
ture. They are largely still judging the 
last six months in relation to Germany 
German commitment to building  
capabilities must be married  
with French self-confidence
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and its “corona presidency.” But even 
without the Germans at the helm, the 
existence of strong institutions would 
have given the EU the capacity to re-
act to the unforeseen pandemic. More 
important still, these same institu-
tions seem to be turning the EU’s prov-
en capacity to react into an ability to 
shape. Commission President Ursula 
von der Leyen has tasked Vice Presi-
dent Maroš Šefčovič with streamlining 
strategic foresight across the EU insti-
tutions. Thus, alongside rather typical 
strategies on sustainable economic de-
velopment, climate targets, and digi-
tal transformation, the Commission is 
producing novel papers on Europe’s 
“multiple futures” and how to work to-
ward the best of them.
This interest in Europe’s long-term fu-
ture has infected the member states. 
In the realm of foreign, security, and 
defence policy, the Strategic Com-
pass initiative points in a good direc-
tion. It will contribute to establishing 
a shared strategic culture and arriv-
ing at shared goals in security and de-
fence. As a process, it fills in the gaps 
left by the grand-sounding “European 
Global Strategy.” Likewise, the Europe-
an Semester and other such economic, 
macroeconomic, and fiscal procedures 
serve to steer political and econom-
ic developments in the right direction 
and facilitate cross-sectoral supervi-
sion and planning. Like the EU’s “Vul-
nerability Assessments” in the field of 
border management, these process-
es encourage a conversation between 
member states – often those that 
are hard hit and peripheral – and the 
Commission about how to jointly pre-
pare for an unknown future. 
Still, these strategy documents, pro-
cedures, and instruments can only be 
effective if member states implement 
and adhere to them. The develop-
ment of a proactive capacity to shape 
will require a larger degree of forward 
thinking and forward planning – on 
the EU level but especially on the na-
tional level. In order to make progress, 
then, feasible implementation plans 
are needed on a regional, national, 
transnational, and European level that 
are backed by political will. Silos need 
to be broken down and flagship proj-
ects fleshed out. As always, Germany – 
as the EU’s biggest member state – will 
need to play an exemplary role in this 
effort. Consequently, its “corona pres-
idency” should only be the beginning 
of a larger process; one that empow-
ers the next German government fol-
lowing the country’s federal election in 
autumn 2021. 
AIM FOR THE BEST, 
PREPARE FOR THE 
WORST, AND BEWARE 
OF INERTIA
In order to build on the existing 
strengths of German European poli-
cy and also encourage a new and more 
ambitious strategic culture, DGAP 
launched a f lagship project on “Eu-
rope’s capacity to act.” This project aims 
to foster an EU that can set and pursue 
long-term goals while also being resil-
ient and agile enough to absorb and re-
act to unforeseen or less likely events 
going forward. A multipolar world con-
fronts Europe with multiple futures, 
and the COVID-19 pandemic will not be 
the only unpleasant surprise. Europe-
an “capacity to act” requires prepared-
ness and action on three main levels: 
 
 
Engaging in short- and long-term 
horizon scanning based on fore-
sight exercises in combination 
with effective and streamlined ear-
ly-warning tools as well as identi-
fying risks and opportunities that 





Setting concrete policy goals and 
defining the resources, tools, and 
implementation steps required to 





Strengthening overall resilience to 
be prepared not only for possible 
worst case scenarios, but also for 
the big positive unknown future
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